Abstract. Classical economic theory following Bentham and Mill assumes decision makers are completely informed, highly sensitive to differences between alternatives, and above all rational in being able to rank order the possible alternatives and choose among them on some measure of welfare (utility maximization). In recent years, this view has been successfully challenged by empirical studies of decision making, and many alternative decision rules have emerged (such as lexicographic, elimination by aspects, counting, conjunctive, heuristic additive difference, affective, take the best, and so on). Despite thirty years' work on boundedly rational and cognitive approaches, the classical view is still widely accepted in urban travel demand modeling. This paper develops a newer conceptual framework for shopping travel situtations önamely, choice of shopping place on different kinds of tour, for different orders of goods, and for regional malls and neighborhood centers. Hypotheses concerning the use of different kinds of decision rule are generated for the different situations or contexts. A statistical design is provided for tests of these hypotheses using fieldwork, verbal protocol analysis, and low-level t-tests. Fifty-five MIT students are interviewed, and their protocols for the shopping situations recorded and analyzed. The findings are that decision rules are multiple and vary with context. Although the specific hypotheses of the paper are not strongly supported, there is overwhelming evidence of the widespread use of simple heuristics. Implications of the findings are drawn for future work in the travel demand field and the preference and choice field. In addition, the contribution of this paper to behavioral decision making is noted, through the extension of work on choice heuristics to a different field (travel demand) and the use of a fieldwork qualitative methodology.
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Although Simon challenged the classical view earlier, in 1955, it still remains dominant in economics (McFadden, 1999) . This paper will help to demonstrate that it is time to move beyond universal, general theories of preference and choice. In their place I will advocate partial field-oriented situation-based (1) explanations grounded in empirical worköin particular, using heuristic rules. This is in the mood of endeavors in, say, economic geography, at the moment (see Barnes, 2001) , and of endeavors also appearing in applied economic work (Arentze and Timmermans, 2005; Zhang et al, 2003) .
After thirty years' endeavor, summaries of substitutable heuristic rules were provided by Payne et al (1993) and Bettman et al (1998) with Gigerenzer et al (1999) demonstrating an ongoing interest. Other recent articles showing a continuing interest in this area are Kahneman and Tversky's response to critiques (1996) , Shiv and Fedorikhin's examination of affect and cognition (1999), Carmon et al's study of option attachment (2003), Ravi and Simonson's investigation of the effect of forced choice on choice (2003), Drolet's study of temporal rule variability (2003) , and Sunstein's work on moral heuristics (2006) . A summary of rules substituting for utility maximization and their specifics is given in table 1. The affective heuristic is included because it is à shortcut' (Russo and Carlson, 2002, page 386) and because it is one of the most recent advances in this field.
There remains debate over the`constructive' nature of choice and of the possibility of individuals selecting strategies on the fly`to meet different metagoals' (minimizing effort, maximizing accuracy, and so on) (for example, Bettman et al, 1998) . The experimental procedures for investigating all these possibilities are not well developed. For that reason, more preliminary work on decision strategies will be undertaken here than that proposed by constructive analysis.
To turn to another field, which should be seen within the foregoing setting, the classical view of preference and choice is still widely accepted in travel demand modeling, which informs transportation planning in metropolitan areas (Bhat, 2003; 2007; McFadden, 2000) . Psychological heuristics (lexicographic, conjunctive, equal weight, affective, take the best, and so on) are not well integrated into the transportation literature. This is despite a long interest in boundedly rational behavior: for example, Garling et al (1998) . Golledge and Garling (2003) review the outcomes of the non-utility-maximizing literature in the travel behavior field. (2) One laudable attempt to introduce noncompensatory heuristics in a systematic way was made by , and with Albatross. This is an activity-based travel system founded on microsimulation of decision rules, where the rules comprised statements such as`if purpose type is work then make an after stop'. This extends the tradition of nonoptimizing, boundedly rational models that I have alluded to in the travel demand area, with an increased degree of sophistication and technical expertise. This system performs better than a utility-maximizing model (Arentze et al, 2001 ). However, it does not solve the problem of integrating many of the different psychological heuristics which are an alternative to rational choice within the travel demand area. Moreover, in one most recent reformulation of Albatross using Bayesian networks, the interpretation of rules is problematic (Janssens et al, 2004) . In Aurora and Feathers , the authors revert to utility-maximizing models but there remains interest in rule driven work in the travel demand field. It is with this`cutting edge' that this paper also connects.
(1) By`situation based' I mean referring to local contexts such as the contents of choice sets for shopping by individuals for different kinds of shopping travel usually performed in submetropolitan areas. This coincides with the classic context effects referred to by Payne et al (1993) .
(2) Golledge, in particular, was concerned with nonoptimizing route choice rules as the result of an early article in 1995.
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P Burnett Table 1 . Alternative decision rules (sources: Bettman and Park, 1980; Bettman et al, 1998; Gigerenzer et al, 1999; Martignon and Krauss, 2003; Montgomery, 1993; Payne et al, 1988; Russo and Dosher, 1983; Russo et al, 1989; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1998 
Affective
Responsive to emotional states more than cognitive rules Mention of mood, stimulusÐinduced sensation, intensity of reaction, constrained decision-making resources, impulsiveness.
Take the best
Validity of one or more attributes or alternatives (best predictors in prior cases).
a The process element which, when present, indicates a rule is being used (for example, Bettman and Park, 1980, appendix) is shown on the right column outside parentheses. The contents of the parentheses in this column clarify how a decision is made using the selected process elements. b A cutoff process is a process used instead of consideration of all attributes and alternatives.
But, despite this behavioral work, the staple in the travel demand area still remains the RUM-based utility-maximizing discrete choice model, especially varieties of the logit model. McFadden (2000) traces its history, Bhat (2003; 2007) gives recent extensions, and Shiftan et al (2003) and Outwater et al (2003) discuss practical applications in Tel-Aviv and San Francisco. The use of discrete choice modeling has now spread from revealed choice to stated choice (Stopher and Lee Gosselin, 1997) to hybrid approaches and into activity-based modeling (Bowman and Ben-Akiva, 2000; Janssens et al, 2004; Wen and Koppelman, 2000) . (3) One finding of the decades of work in psychology is also that nonoptimizing decision rules vary with context (choice set) (Payne et al, 1993; Tversky and Simonson, 1993) . In psychology, this meant variation in the attributes of a choice set (such as correlation and dispersion) or variation in background variables, such as time pressure. This relates to the definitions used here, which are the situations: (1) choice of shopping tour, (2) choice of groceries and (3) choice of clothing shopping destinations, and (4) choice of regional shopping center and (5) choice of local shopping destinations. It is easy to argue that the attributes of each destination choice set for each situation will differ and thus the context or situation will differ. The examination of shopping travel was selected because the number of trips for this purpose now exceeds the number of trips for commuting, as is generally known. In the travel demand literature, the influence of environment, situation, or location on travel has been taken into account by some, but not yet linked to the study of heuristic decision rules in such a context or situation. Garling and Golledge edited an early book in 1993 clearly attempting to relate cognitive approaches to the environment and behavior; Garling (1995) extended this work with introductory remarks linking the cognized environment and urban travel behavior. There were also alternative context^situation^environment-oriented approachesöfor example, the neighborhood travel model of Liamond et al (2005) . In other views, situation is much closer to residential location (Bamberg et al, 2003) and region (Matthews and Hill, 1990) . Thus, there has been a distinctive orientation in travel behavior recognizing the importance of context: however, situations have not been defined as here, nor linked with the heuristics proposed in this paper. This calls into question accepted behavioral travel demand models on another ground, for they attempt to replace the four-step aggregate planning models with others operating at a similar scale. As noted I will shift scale here to a context-oriented or situation-oriented decision-making enquiry. This will suggest moving work beyond discrete choice or other contemporary views.
To this point I have: (1) reviewed the need for a shift away from classical utilitymaximizing approaches in work on preference and choice; (2) seen that the classical approach is still widespread in studies of travel demand; (3) briefly suggested simple noncompensatory rules and local, partial explanations and interpretations to move theory forward.
I now set up an alternative conceptual framework based on hypotheses about decision making and shopping travel based on the literature, outline a test for them, and go on to test them and to present results. My concluding discussion will assess the proposed advance. The hypotheses are meant to be illustrative, not comprehensive. They are based on methods of research in other fields where deductive theories and models are not always applied, such as marketing (Bettman and Park, 1980) (3) There has been sporadic recent interest in investigating the logit model with`cutoffs' following Swait (2001) öfor example, Cantillo and Ortuzar (2005) . There has also been recent interest in the use of specific rules for specific trips (on mode choice see Zhang, 2006) . These are mainly isomorphic modelsöthere is no claim they represent ways people actually think. As Swait remarks, the heuristics people use should be identified (2001, page 147).
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P Burnett and accounting (Anderson and Potter, 1998) . The tests use qualitative methods and fieldwork (Burnett, 2006; Larsen et al, 2006) . The design of such fieldwork methods helps to contribute not only to travel behavior but also to behavioral decision making, where many methods are used but qualitative fieldwork designs are still not customary. To conclude this introductory section, it is noted that this paper has left aside other contemporary views of travel and shopping behavior to focus on those of relevance here. For example, social network analysis Urry, 2003) and online shopping (Papola and Polydoropoulou, 2006) have not been pursued.
2 A partial theory of shopping travel I now move to a set of context-based hypotheses comprising a partial theory of travel based on the literature-derived heuristics of table 1. In doing this, I will not only be helping to extend some results of behavioral decision making to a new field, but also be setting up a goal, in the travel demand area, of identifying which heuristics may predominate in which travel situation.
2.1 Hypotheses: daily activity patterns (tours) (situation 1) Individuals choose daily activity patterns (tours) öfor example, home^shop^home. Shopping travel (Bowman and Ben-Akiva, 2000; McNally, 1997) or maintenance stops (Wen and Koppelman, 2000) are incorporated into these patterns. Optional patterns are available: for example Bowman and Ben-Akiva list fifty-four activity purpose^tour choice options in a Boston dataset, with six primary options involving options other than school, home, or work. McNally's (1997) geographical information systems simulation of activities offers representative patterns of shopping^work and shopping^social^shopping, two of a number discovered. But most useful here is Wen and Koppelman's classification of activity-travel patterns (tours) (2000, pages 15^16): HMWH, HWMH, HMH, MHOH, where H is home, W is work, M is maintenance stop, and O is leisure stop. All four are possible for workers; the last two are possible for nonworkers. These form the basis of:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Alternative decision rules, rather than the classic utility-maximizing one, govern the choice of daily activity pattern (Payne et al, 1993) .
Hypothesis 2 (H2):
Because the activity-travel pattern options (eg, HMWH or HMH ) are complex, the simplest decision rules may be used [counting, lexicographic, conjunctive, take the best (Payne et al, 1993; Martignon and Krauss, 2003) ]. Because options may be routinized/low involvement, the simplest decision rules may again be used (Roberts and Lilien, 1993, page 55) .
Other hypotheses concerning daily activity-travel patterns may be defined as follows. It is standard practice to link socioeconomic and demographics to choices. In the activity pattern case, choice of a pattern with shopping has been linked to, for example, the number of children in the household, the number of vehicles in the household, and the number of workers in the household (Wen and Koppelman, 2000) . In Bowman and Ben-Akiva (2000) homemakers with young children perform most shopping travel. In Bhat et al (2004) , the shopping activity pattern (here erratic or regular) is linked to gender. Market segmentation to find the sociodemographics that will best predict shopping travel is also common in the marketing and geography literatures (for example, Finn and Louviere, 1990; Gonzalez et al, 2000; Moore, 1989; Wang and Cheng, 2001 ). Mobility, affluence, and time constraints, as measured by car ownership and by the employment status of the principal shopper, are among those demographics found most significant (Golledge and Stimson, 1997; Moore, 1989) .
From these considerations, the following hypotheses can be drawn for the present setting.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Affluence, indicated by years of education, affects the choice of decision rule and hence choice of shopping activity pattern. The more educated an individual is the more he or she is able to process information in accordance with the utility-maximizing rule (Payne et al, 1993) .
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Those with tighter constraints (more children in the household) will utilize simpler, non-utility-maximizing decision rules and choose different shopping activity patterns (Payne et al, 1988; 1993) .
Hypotheses: goods (situations 2 and 3)
Having considered the choice of an activity pattern containing shopping, we now turn to the issue of the distribution of trips to shopping places. As a start, we consider store choice from choice sets for a lower order (groceries) and higher order (clothing) good, respectively. These vary in trip frequency to destinations and thus in level of experience with them, one important factor that may influence choices and decision rules (Bettman and Park, 1980) . Some alternative hypotheses for these situations are:
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Non-utility-maximizing decision rules may be used in store choice for a lower order good (groceries), which is a routinized, low-involvement good.
The weighted adding decision rule (utility maximization) may be used for store choice for a higher order good (clothing) that is a high-involvement good (Roberts and Lilien, 1993) .
Hypothesis 6 (H6):
The weighted adding decision rule may be used instead with the low-order good because of high familiarity with it (Lucas, 1987 ) .
In the more complex shopping goods situation, a simple decision rule (conjunctive, lexicographic, counting, take the best) may be used instead because it is easy (Martignon and Krauss, 2003; Payne et al, 1993) .
Hypothesis 7 (H7):
In the shopping goods situation, an affective rule might be used because of the emotional, personal appeal of such goods and because information overload strains cognitive processes (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999) .
Hypothesis 8 (H8):
In the case of both goods, a phased decision rule may be used alternatively to simplify the consideration set to a choice set and then to make a choice. In this instance, a simple decision rule (non-utility-maximizing) is normally followed by a utility-maximizing strategy (Bettman et al, 1998) . Elements of both would be present.
Finally in the area of sociodemographics, we have the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 9 (H9): Prior knowledge and experience may affect decision making, with rules requiring less processing being prevalent at high and low frequency of use. Utility maximization may be used with goods at the moderate trip frequency level (very high and very low frequency goods do not cause as much processing). This is an empirical finding from Bettman and Park (1980) .
Hypotheses: centers (situations 4 and 5)
The final illustrative situations concern choice of shopping centeröchoice of many lower order centers, and choice of fewer higher order centers. These embrace (1) neighborhood 2264 P Burnett shopping centers, for example, and (2) regional shopping malls as different components of the well-known urban hierarchy (Hartshorn, 1992) .
Hypothesis 10 (H10):
The simplest (and easiest) non-utility-maximizing decision rules [elimination by aspects (EBA), counting lexicographic, conjunctive, take the best] may be used in the very complex choice situation for regional order centers; utility-maximizing rules may be rarely used to select regional order centers (Martignon and Krauss, 2003) .
Hypothesis 11 (H11):
The affective rule may be used because of the design of higher order centers for intensity of personal appeal and experience (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999) .
To turn to the more numerous lower order centers, these are also defined by a complex set of attributes (location, size, price, and so on). Because of their larger number, we may hypothesize:
Hypothesis 12 (H12): A two-phase decision strategy may be used to, first, limit the choice set to a more manageable size, and, second, to choose a center. As is common, the first decision rule used will be non-utility-maximizing (eg elimination by aspects); the second rule may be compensatory (utility-maximizing) (Bettman et al, 1998) . If the second rule proves noncompensatory, this may be again because of the need for ease in a very complex choice situation.
Finally, can sociodemographics be associated in some way with these shopping situations? Auto ownership affects mobility and reach (Dijst and Vidakovic, 1997) ; this may be translated into the number of accessible options in the consideration set of shopping centers. From this we have:
Hypothesis 13 (H13): In the case of higher order centers (regional malls), a higher degree of auto ownership will increase the already great complexity of the choice problem by expanding the number of centers considered. As auto ownership increases, the simplicity and ease of the decision rule will increase.
Hypothesis 14 (H14):
In the case of lower order centers (neighborhood centers), a higher degree of auto ownership will increase the number of options considered. As auto ownership increases, the amount of phased decision-making increases.
The purpose of the situations (contexts) set up by the fourteen hypotheses, out of the many possible hypotheses which could be considered here, (4) is to help break down rational choice and utility maximization as a monolithic widespread theoretical structure. Tests of the hypotheses should give new directions in which to go, in specific circumstances. Given the literature that has been brought to bear in framing the hypotheses, it seems unlikely that they should fail on all fronts and support rational choice. Even if success is only partial, this helps to undermine the classic position. I therefore now turn to illustrate how these hypotheses may be tested, carry out the tests using verbal protocols, and indicate new directions ahead.
Hypothesis testing methods

Verbal protocols
Two common kinds of procedure out of many available may be used to test the hypotheses: verbal protocol analysis and simple statistical tests of the results such as t-tests and analysis of variance. Verbal protocol analysis is designed to collect and code data for individuals' decision strategies. The specific verbal protocol questionnaire used here may be obtained from the author. Individuals were asked to record their thoughts as they select their choice of tour, groceries destination, clothing destination, neighborhood center, and regional mall. Prompts and probes were used. The subjects were asked to think about the last trip they made of each type.
Data were collected from a purposive sample of sixty students, both protocols and sociodemographics (age, income, year in college, car ownership, and number of children in household). The size of sample is similar to that used in some qualitative studies (Kemper et al, 2003) . The advantages of such samples for qualitative research are: ease of access, ease of administration, and authenticity of the data (Burnett, 2006) . The homogeneity of the sample does create some degree of difficulty in examining hypotheses about sociodemographic variation, though there is usually some sociodemographic variability to conduct tests. Also there is a further difficulty over the generalizability of results. Peterson (2001) contains an excellent discussion of both issues for the widely used student samples. The usual strategy is followed hereö to recommend off-campus replication. A modest $5 participation incentive for the sampled individuals was used. The median income of the respondents was $20 000, slightly below the college median, but it was not judged that the incentive had an income bias. Although the protocol was pretested with ten individuals, five of the completed questionnaires were unusable, leaving thirty women and twenty-five men in the survey. The nature of this survey, a shopping survey, would be more attractive to women, since traditional gender roles still influence the allocation of shopping activities (Srinivasan and Bhat, 2004) . However, male students and female students completed the survey in about equal numbers, giving a balanced design by age, income, education, and number of cars in the household. The students were intercepted at an activities area on campus.
Verbal protocols have been consistently advocated by Ericsson and Simon in their Bible', Protocol Analysis (1993 [1984] ), in each of the editions. They provide reviews of the literature both for and against the methodology. The issues of reactivity (verbalization changing the primary process, for example, from a more complex compensatory to a simpler one) and veridicality (errors of omission and commission) have long commanded attention [from Nisbett and Wilson (1979) onwards] . Recent experiments with complex decision making (Maani and Maharaj, 2004) show that the verbal protocols used here should recover both simple and complex heuristics.
The verbalizations elicited for each individual were transcribed. The transcription for each individual was divided into phrases (Ericsson and Simon, 1993 [1984] ; Payne et al, 1993) . In this case, each phrase represents a decision process element, such as are to be found in table 1. Other examples of decision process elements forming phrases from a protocol are to be found in table 2, taken from Bettman and Park (1980, appendix) . A code is assigned to each decision process element, as exemplified in this table. Two independent coders are normally used and the percentage of codes and phrases agreeing between the two is tallied to ensure lack of bias. The percentage of codes agreeing here was 85%. (The detailed code sheet for this study is available from the author.) Then codes (phrases) (decision process elements) are assigned to each noncompensatory and compensatory decision rule. One such assignment is again exemplified in table 1. It is also exemplified in the pioneering work by Bettman and Park (1980) . (5) The number of phrases for an individual for a situation or context will (5) The coding of protocols can now be done by computer software. However, the nuances of the text may evade the computer. For this reason, manual coding procedures are still in widespread use (Rubin and Rubin, 1995 For a further discussion of issues in protocol analysis see Russo et al (1989) . (6) (7) 3.2 Statistical tests
The information in the matrix for a context in table 3 feeds into simple statistical tests such as standard t-tests and analysis of variance designs to test the hypotheses (Roberts and Russo, 1999) . (8) Illustrative examples may be taken for H6, clothing shopping, and H2 choice of tour, respectively. With respect to H6 ö that, say, counting rules may be used instead of compensatory ones ö refer to the data for table 3. For choice of clothing destination, the columns, number of counting phrases, and number of compensatory (weighted adding) phrases are relevant. The difference between counting and compensatory phrase numbers is taken for each subject down the columns in turn. The mean of these differences is then taken and the operational test is that the mean equals zero. The precise formulae for the within subjects t-test are given in Roberts and Russo (1999, page 19) . There is one one caveat to using t-tests in this fashion: only three or four of them may be used in any particular shopping situation because of limitations owing to degrees of freedom (Roberts and Russo, 1999) . This is a type 1 test.
To illustrate an analysis of variance design for choice of tour, H2, I set up a type-2 test. The data may be set up in the following manner: column 1, tour type; column 2, mean number of compensatory phrases per individual for each tour type; columns 3^6, the same for counting, lexicographic, conjunctive, and affective phrases. For H2 five analysis of variance runs are indicated by choice of tour and each separate decision rule. This will yield the details of decision making for each type of choice öthat is, for each choice situation whether there is an association of the particular decision rule with the tour.
For hypotheses about demographics, a two-sample t-test was designed. This was a type-3 test. First, take H3 as an example: the others were examined in a similar way. This hypothesis posits``The more educated an individual is the more he or she is able to process information in accordance with the utility-maximizating rule.'' The subjects were divided into two classes (for this hypothesis, undergraduate and postgraduate). For a context (here tour choice), the scores of the number of phrases for a decision rule were tabulated for each subject in each class. This was repeated for each decision rule of interest. Two-sample t-tests were run for educational status and scores' for two classes, for each rule separately. This would show whether there was an association between the class variable (sociodemographic) and rule, for the particular context.
The tests for the different hypotheses and situations are summarized in table 4.
(6) Payne (personal communication) believes that concurrent protocols result only from verbalized forms not written forms, as here. However, he is at odds with Ericsson and Simon (1993 [1984] ) on this point and with some current practice.`Thoughtlisting' yields`retrospective' protocols which, provided they are stimulated by questions on immediately past tasks, can be treated like concurrent protocols (Ericsson and Simon, 1993 [1984] , page 19).
One view is that a lack of generalizability here owing to the student sample restricts the study to an examination of protocols as process-tracing methods. These are verbal protocols where they trace the use of information step-by-step from the predecision to the final decision (Bettman et al, 1998; Ford et al, 1989) . In the present instance, the protocols have been examined as semistructured interviews in a qualitative survey with a small purposive sample. The provisionally acceptable results are outcomes-nominated rules and choices (Burnett, 2006 ) önot search processes.
(8) Golledge and Stimson (1997) allow the use of low-level statistical techniques as part of qualitative enquiry (see also Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) .
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The analysis of the protocol data is hypothesis driven in order to build up an alternative partial theory of travel to those compensatory theories in common use in this field. I am well aware that a more comprehensive and revealing analysis of protocol data could perhaps have been performed without using any hypotheses, a la, for example, Newell and Simon (1972) .
All statistical tests here were performed using Stata.
Results
The number of phrases by decision rule for all contexts or situations may first be considered before turning to the hypotheses regarding each one separately (table 5) . Only decision rules which appeared in the data are included. Table 5 does not suggest that decision rules vary in a simple way by situation or context as the hypotheses advance. For example, in the choice of tour or activity pattern, affective, lexicographic, and counting rules appear to be dominant, with no entries for other noncompensatory rules; even compensatory rules appear only once. On the other hand, choice of regional shopping center has representatives of all decision rules, with compensatory, counting, and affective rules especially prominent. There were three surprises from this first glance at the data:
1. the extent to which compensatory decision making appeared to be used; 2. the extent to which affective appeals appeared to be relied on; 3. the extent to which the simplest rule, the counting rule, is used. There was generally a split in the sample between those who used compensatory rules and those who used elements of other rules. For instance, for groceries shopping, only four subjects used both compensatory and counting rules whereas twenty eight Situation-related travel demandand twenty three used these separately. Therefore, table 5 provides the data, for two very preliminary conclusions, which I will go further and test as I test the hypotheses:
(1) decision rules vary in a complex manner with context or situation; (2) simple decision rules are in widespread use, as is the use of compensatory rules or trade-offs. This hints at a complex analytical trajectory for future work, with different rules used by different proportions of a population (or with different probabilities) in future models, for example. Some examples of simple decision rules from the individual protocols are as follows:
Subject 1: Choice of tour.``I like the idea of leaving my house with my mind set on shopping and then eating out and lastly coming home. I feel satisfied with myself when I can accomplish some shopping and have a meal with a shopping friend.'' (Two affective statements.) Subject 3: Choice of place for groceries shopping.
McGregor``Convenience.''`B ecause it takes the card.'' (Counting.) (Recall that lists are the process element indicating that the counting rule is being used. From the list, the most desirable place is selected, see table 1).
An example of a subject using the more complex, compensatory rule with trade-offs is: Subject 2: Choice of place for groceries shopping.`I prefer a supermarket as I can compare prices easily. I enjoy shopping in smaller shops more but am worried by the inability to see how cheap it is. Socially there's pressure to shop in small shopsöantiglobalization.'' Hypotheses (1) and (2) refer to a simple relationship between choice of tour and decision rule. No statistical tests were necessary to confirm that simple noncompensatory rules dominated over compensatory trade-offs in this particular situation according to H1. There was only 1 trade-off in the eighty-nine decision process elements (phrases) used to select from HWSH, HSWH, HSH, HOSH, and HSOH (H is home, W is work, S is shopping, O is other). The dominance of the affective rule was not originally hypothesized in H2, which posed counting, lexicographic, conjunctive, and take the best rules as alternatives to a compensatory one. The results of within subjects t-tests to sort out the relative importance of the different noncompensatory rules for this situation are shown in table 6. These results are as follows: the counting rule is significantly less important than the affective rule; counting and lexicographic rules taken together are equal in importance to the affective rule. We may return to the wording on the original protocols to see what is driving these affective choices.
Subject 2:``I don't enjoy shopping when tired. I would rather set out to shop and then return home rather than be over-busy.'' (Chose HSH.) Subject 7:``I chose HSOH because shopping is very social for me. I usually go with friends and then we do something after like going to dinner or a movie. I also like to look nice while shopping so it takes me a while to get ready. Then I am tired from walking around all day and being with my friends so I always want to go home and relax.'' Subject 11:``I dislike shopping so I just want to go in the store get what I want and leave.'' (Chose HWSH.) Subject 35:``After working for a while and feeling productive, I would want to take a break and relax through shopping. Afterwards I would be tired and probably want to go home.'' (Chose HWSH.) Table 6 . Results of type 1 t-tests for decision rules by situation and hypothesis (number of subjects is 55).
Tours : H2 Regional centers : H10, H11 Counting ± affective phrases Counting ± compensatory phrases 18 counting 35 affective 22 counting 29 compensatory t À2X0357 P b jtj 0X0467 t 0X3750 P b jtj 0X7091 (Counting or lexicographic) ± affective phrases Counting ± affective phrases 46 counting or lexicographic 35 affective 22 counting 16 affective
Groceries shopping : H5, H6 Lower order centers : H12 (Lexicographic or counting)Ð (Counting or lexicographic)Ð Compensatory phrases compensatory phrases 44 lexicographic or counting 28 compensatory 34 counting or lexicographic 18 compensatory t 1X7480 P b jtj 0X0861 t 2X2561 P b jtj 0X0281 Counting ± affective phrases Clothing shopping : H5, H6 Counting ± compensatory phrases 18 counting 12 affective 30 counting 15 compensatory t À1X4275 P b jtj 0X1592 t 1X7844 P b jtj 0X0800 H7 lexicographic ± affective phrases 13 lexicographic 9 affective t 0X3218 P b jtj 0X7489
Note: H 0 : mean diff 0.
Situation-related travel demand
There is evidence here that subjects are`affect monitoring' in their selection of activity patterns, and displaying``primacy of feelings in judgment'' in this context (Pham et al, 2001 ). This indicates that considerable work needs to be done on affect in activity patterns. The other two simple rules that are important in tour selection besides the affective rule are the lexicographic and counting rules. This is the only context in which the lexicographic rule is so important. Examples from the protocols include, for these two decision rules:
Subject 11:``I only go shopping if I am already out, hence the HWSH.'' (Lexicographic.) Subject 37:``Two principles determined my answer.'' (HWSH.) 1.``Do shopping last before returning home so I don't have to carry purchases during other activities. 2. Assuming that I work M^F, I would rather shop in the evenings during the week and leave the weekend free for other activities.'' (Counting.) Again the dominance of simple rules in the context of tours/activity-travel patterns shows the need to use a technique other than optimization in the analysis of this form of travel behavior.
To refine this result, an analysis was undertaken as exemplified in the analysis of variance design in section 3. First, the number of subjects selecting each tour type was tabulated, showing HWSH the most commonly chosen type. Next the mean number of phrases per individual for counting, lexicographic, and affective rules was entered for each tour type (HWSH, HSWH, HSH, HSOH, HOSH). Three analyses of variance were then run, of tour type and counting rule, tour type and lexicographic rule, and tour type and affective rule. These would show if there was any association between a specific rule and tour type. Only the counting rule is significantly associated with tour type. The predominance of counting phrases lies in the more complex HWSH, HSOH, and HOSH patterns. A substantive interpretation is that although counting, lexicographic, and affective (simple) rules may generally be used in tour-activity pattern selection, and need attention in future research, the counting rule may require particular study because of its use in more complex situations. We will see its use in this way again later.
Contexts:
(1) choice of destination for lower order goods (groceries); (2) choice of destination for higher order goods (clothing) I now turn to the situations of lower order and higher order goods and decision rules. H5, H6, and H7 taken together pose that:
(1) compensatory and simple rules may dominate groceries shopping; (2) compensatory, simple, and affective rules may dominate clothing shopping. While the hypotheses seem supported for groceries shopping, counting rules seem most important for clothing shopping (table 5). In the counting rule for groceries shopping, the most frequently used simple rule, convenience, is most often found as a desirable feature. However, for clothing, counting seems to be used to break down a complex decision as follows: decompose a large number of desirable features down into 1^4 lists approximately covering 1^10 features; choose 1^4 destinations that match the lists. The protocols cites show how this is done. The use of the counting rule to handle a complex choice context seems in the instances cited to provide satisfactory clothing shopping alternatives. Perhaps this may not provide the optimum member of a destination set as in classical theory, using compensatory (trade-off ) decision making. This different behavior indicates the desirability of exploring in a different direction from the usual choice theoryösetting up models using the counting rule for clothing shopping, for example.
The relative importance of the different rules for the choice situation for groceries and clothing shopping, respectively, (table 5) is shown in the t-tests of table 6. The t-test for (lexicographic or counting) minus compensatory phrases over subjects for groceries fails at the 5% level: there is no significant difference. This means there is also no significant difference in the usage of trade-offs or the simpler rules in groceries shopping. There needs to be some further investigation of the circumstances (degree of involvement, familiarity) leading to the split.
Examples of counting and compensatory rules from the groceries shopping protocol are illustrative.
Subject 18:``Discount StoreöGet little things for close to nothing, i.e., cleaning supplies, containers Large Chain StoreöBuy in bulk for a better price use store discount card for savings MarketöCheap vegetables and fruit. Fresh if you get there early.'' [Counting (lack of involvement and familiarity?)] Subject 37:``There are two grocery stores near my house, both Star Markets but the nearer is usually more crowded and takes longer. If I am only buying a few items and have limited time, I will walk to the nearer; otherwise I prefer to wait until my wife's car is available and drive to the farther store. Given identical selections, I value fewer crowds and more pleasant ambience over convenient access. I don't feel the need to spend more on`boutique' groceries, i.e., Bread and Circus; I don't feel the difference in quality (if any) justifies the price difference.'' [Compensatory (trade-offs) (familiarity)]. With reference to the t-tests for the clothing situation, the first adds to previous results. While I have found that counting is an important simple rule to consider, the test shows that compensatory decision making is still important in this context. The t-test for a difference (compensatory is much less important) is significant at the 10% level. The analysis of spatial choice for higher order goods may also require mixed strategies in the future. The second t-test for the clothing context specifically relates to H7 and the proposed role of affect in destination choice. From table 5, affect does not seem to be particularly important. From the t-test, the affective rule is only as important as the lexicographic rule (see also table 5). Thus, H7 does not appear to be supported. This is surprising as it would seem that emotional factors should play a role in clothing shopping.
With regards to phased decision rules with compensatory and simple rules appearing in the data for the same subject for clothing or groceries, this occurred only in the isolated case. For example, only in four instances in clothing shopping did subjects show they were combining counting and compensatory rules. Thus, H8 positing the usual two-rule phases in decision making also was not upheld here for these goods. For choice of regional shopping center and decision rule (H10, H11) we note again from table 5 that all the rules appear in the data for the subjects. This is unlike other shopping contexts. However, compensatory, counting, and affective rules stand out. The t-tests of table 6 show that compensatory and counting rules are equally as important, with affective rules significantly less important than counting rules. Thus, H10 does not appear to be supported, but H11 has some support. This is another different context without a single choice rule, which may require different mixed analytical strategies in the future.
Examples of subjects using the dominant rules may again be taken from the protocols.
Subject 46:``Downtown wins out, but a mall might have specific stores (i.e., discount shoes in not overly weird styles) worth going to. Downtown can be managed during a lunchtime by subwayöno parking problems no weekend scheduling. Downtown brings possibility of food in Chinatown but that brings threat of MSG in food which they promise won't contain it.'' (Trade-offs^compensatory.) Subject 11:``Oh God I hate malls. When I step inside I want to run out within 5 minutes. I feel like my soul is getting sucked right out of me. If I had to go to a mall (run in and out in 10 minutes to pick up something) I'd go to the Cambridgeside Galleria since it's close to MIT and my house.'' (Affective^lexicographic.) Subject 35:``I prefer Copley/Prudential because in one small radius there are many stores to choose from and a large option of choices. I might not necessarily buy anything because of high prices but would have fun window-shopping.'' (Counting^affective). I last turn to the context of lower order centers and the decision rule. H12 posits that two simple rules in a phased decision may show up together in a subject's data. This is not the case. For example, although counting, lexicographic, and affective rules are all used, only two subjects combine their use. If we change the phased decision making to a combination of a compensatory rule and a simple rule we get a similar result. Thus, H12 is rejected.
The t-tests in table 6 show (1) counting and lexicographic (simple) rules dominate over compensatory rules in this context; (2) affective rules are of secondary importance but as important as compensatory rules. Given the importance of the simple counting and lexicographic rules, perhaps models using simple decision rules could be developed for shopping at lower order centers in the future.
Examples of subjects using counting and lexicographic rules from the protocols are: Subject 20:``I don't like a dingy store. I like the store to be well lit and clean. I am particular about the hygiene and dress of the storekeeper.'' (Lexicographic.) Subject 38:``Usually because it's closer to home, easier to get to.'' (Lexicographic.) Subject 43:``This is a hard question. I almost never buy anything from small stores. Generally I get the feeling that they are overpriced and hold some sort of unfair trade advantage (monopoly). I have often browsed through stores with my friends, but I never intend to buy anything. Sometimes, if it is a family store with cheap prices, I might buy something.'' (Counting^undesirable features.) To summarize concerning the hypothesis contexts and decision rules (table 7) : there is support for the general position advanced by the hypotheses that decision rules vary by context or situation. This support has been shown by tables, simple statistical tests, and excerpts from the protocols. The analysis was sufficient to support or reject the details of decision rules and contexts in specific hypotheses. The analysis 2274 P Burnett so far also narrowed down the number of rules that seem to be important in shopping behavior. This could be an advantage for future research.
Sociodemographics, contexts, and rules
The remaining hypotheses relate to sociodemographics and rules in the different contexts. First, take H3 for tour choice. There was no significant difference in decision rules for individuals on the basis of education, so this hypotheses was rejected. For H4, also regarding tour choices, households with young children may be compensatory. Only one household with young children produces this result, but we may still note that this is contrary to H4, which is deemed rejected (provisionally). In the case of H13, car use, decision rule, and regional shopping center choice, twosample (0 cars, 1 cars ) t-tests were run for counting, compensatory, lexicographic, and affective rules. H13 posits that, as car ownership increases, choice of regional shopping center will involve simpler rules. However, a statistically significant twosample t appears for both compensatory and affective rules with more of both being used by 1 car households. The hypothesis is questionable and the reason for this result requires explanation.
With respect to H14, this proposed that phased decision making in the choice of lower order center would increase with car ownership. H14 is rejected: we have already seen that virtually no phased decision making seems to be done by subjects. An exploratory two-sample (0 cars, 1 cars) t-test for counting, lexicographic, compensatory, and affective rules also produces no statistically significant result.
With the lack of sociodemographic segmentation of the data, perhaps owing to the subjects' homogeneity, looking further at an additional possible segmentor seemed desirable. Two-sample t-tests were run by gender for decision rules. The contexts were groceries and clothing shopping since earlier hypotheses had not covered commonly accepted demographics in those areas. For groceries shopping, however, there is no statistically significant gender difference in rules explored (counting, lexicographic, compensatory, affective) . For clothing shopping, too, there was no statistically significant gender difference in rules explored (counting, lexicographic, conjunctive, EBA, compensatory, affective).
The negative findings for the sociodemographics, rules, and contexts are unusual in transportation and travel demand, where socioeconomics have been very much the focus of modeling and enquiry. The homogeneity of the sample and the need to replicate the work with a nonstudent group is one issue. However this paper may shift endeavor more to rules themselves in different contexts than to socioeconomics. I will return to this in a moment in conclusion.
One final note here. No consideration has been yet given to H9 relating prior knowledge and experience and frequency of good use to simple rules if frequency is low or high. This is in the sociodemographic area though other indicators are more usually considered socioeconomics (eg, cars possessed by household). The results of the tests for rules for high frequency (groceries) and low frequency (clothing) goods are shown in table 6. Although simple rules are used in the low frequency case, compensatory rules are important in the high frequency case. Thus, H9 is rejected.
Concluding discussion
Again, the major accomplishment of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing challenge to rational choice and utility maximization in a discussion and real-world field study. This is consonant with the long tradition in psychology and marketing revealed in the introduction. It suggests that standard preference and choice theorỳ works' only because it is a statistical artifact, or perhaps because it is close to describing one situation that is then statistically replicated on an`as if it were true' basis over the rest or believed to be at a different level of abstraction (McFadden, 1999) . It is true that the case study surprisingly found compensatory rules to be important in a number of situations. It is also true that few of the hypotheses setting up an alternative choice theory were acceptable for the case of shopping travel. Yet, the case study also showed that simple rules are widespread, especially the simplest, counting, and also affective rules (table 8) . Much more work needs to be done on real-world studies as to why this is so and on analyses of choice behavior in situations with multiple rules. Fieldwork methods, instead of laboratory methods, may also clarify findings here.
The work builds on the larger area of behavioral decision making, which seeks the actual ways humans think. This is not the place for lengthy discussion of the need for realistic assumptions in theory. Rather, first we may remark that increasing realism in assumptions can be claimed on the grounds of truth and scientific progress (Leontief, 1970) . Next, in travel demand, the incorporation of some heuristics in RUM models via latent class (segmentation) and mixed logit (representation of extreme preference) methods still leaves open the research question as to what heuristics are being used and how. Then the question as to why behavioral decision theory in any form has not`swept away' utility theory is a valid one. Utility theory is giving ground (Ben-Akiva et al, 2002; McFadden, 1999; Roth, 1995) . To continue to subsume advances in the travel demand areaölike the work in this paperöin RUM is therefore questionable. The paper deliberately applies psychological choice heuristics at smaller scales than the metropolitan scale familiar in so many travel behavior models. These new scales of analysis (contexts/situations) may be valuable to the marketing analyst, to the transportation demand management planner, and to the congestion mitigator; they focus on the individual's local choice sets and decisions for specific purposes. These planning scenarios were originally handled by the gravity model, spatial interaction model, discrete choice model and other models of the customer patronage of individual stores. Unconventional attributes (like degree of crowding) could be included in data and analysis (see review by Timmermans, 1993) . However, these are utility-maximizing models. Non-utility-maximizing models are only calibratable with great difficulty (Zhang et al, 2003) . It is therefore probable that the planning scenarios handled by the earlier patronage models will have to be managed by a fully qualitative theory and data. This has been also suggested for the urban cognition domain in travel by Golledge and Garling (2003) .
I remain in choice and decision theory mould. However, the identification of critical attributes of alternatives for subjects for planning using the protocol method here is difficult: one finding from the paper shown in the protocol quotations is that decision making is highly idiosyncratic. Perhaps a larger sample off campus would have yielded different results. This highlights again the need for off-campus replication.
However, this paper has not clearly focused on the choice or decision process, but rather has focused on how different processes make up rules. This is because of the long history of rule-oriented work in behavioral decision making (Russo and Carlson, 2002, page 386 ) and the recent interest in it in behavioral travel demand. Nonetheless, the recasting of this paper to highlight the elements of the process of choice without attaching them to heuristics may be a useful exercise.
The variety of results, especially those shown in table 5, still leaves open the possibility of the effect of the heterogeneity of individuals, as well as context effects, on findings. Again, a small sample size was used here and this indicates the need for larger scale replication. If individuals do then use a variety of decision rules in different situations this would support the findings here. Designs using discrete choice models tò separate out' heterogeneity effects cannot presently be used. They do not preserve`the ways people think' which we have uncovered here, for one thing. Statistical designs to the same end cannot be employed at the moment as the sample is too small.
Certain topics have been left aside owing to the limitations of space. One of these is the link between decision rules in different situations and the formation of routinized and habitual behavior. Lucas (1987) suggests that compensatory rules are used in very familiar (habitual) situations. However, the research here was not designed to see if simple rules are precursors to this or are habitually used too. Another topic left aside is a much fuller consideration of the rich protocol data. These are both topics for future research.
With these remarks, I draw this paper to a conclusion: generalizations about decision rules for different contexts in the real world offer progress for the study of preference and choice. Such generalizations can be sought inside and outside the study of travel demand and, in travel demand, offer a counterpoint to prevailing paradigms.
